

SECRET

2 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: NSC

SUBJECT: 1F-4 FESTMAN - Extension of Project

1. The purpose of this project being to utilize the services, experiences and background of Dr. Gustav Hilger, and, since the employment of this individual will continue until at least 30 June 1950, it is requested that the project be extended, and that additional funds be allocated to provide for the payment of salary.

2. Full accounting has been made for funds advanced. The financial activity of the project is recorded as follows:

	1948 - 49	1949 - 50	Total
Allocated	\$16,285.00	\$4,100.00	\$10,385.00
Expendent	<u>\$6,624.77</u>	<u>\$3,900.00</u>	<u>\$10,524.77</u>
	<u>333.77</u>	<u>\$ 200.00</u>	<u>\$ 139.77</u>

3. Additional funds will be required as follows:

Salary
16 January 1950
to 30 June 1950 \$3,300.00


Signed

Executive Officer, NSC

EWR/jcr

cc: 1) ZJD's file
1) CGS's file
2) Registry, OSC

1 MAR 1950



SECRET

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(C) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

Attack #1

8 March 1960

"Would not our psychological warfare objectives be extremely effectively furthered by our facilitating, through clandestine means, the Yugoslav propaganda offensive against the Comintern and Stalinism.

"Presumably, the Yugoslavs are already fairly effective in this campaign in Europe. The question as far as Europe is concerned is, 'Can they be made even more effective through stepped-up radio power and other necessary mechanical measures?' We have nothing to offer in the way of ideas. Tito's propagandists are obviously far more astute and experienced in this type of operation than anyone in this country.

"Even more important than Europe, it would seem, is Communist Asia as a target for Yugoslav propaganda. Bobley is quoted in an interview with the New York Times early last week (the week of October 3, 1960) as having said that the Chinese Communists 'do not have information on the Yugoslav case. Should we not do everything possible, within a strictly clandestine framework, to enable the Yugoslavs to get their story to the Chinese, North Koreans, the Viet Cong and the Burmese. This is not to say that we should do the translating and distribution of Yugoslav material, even through cut-outs, but that we covertly facilitate the Yugoslavs themselves to take their message to the Asiatic Communists—perhaps even overtly, but certainly on their own."

In view of the revaluation of the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and of the Yugoslav recognition of Ho Chi Minh, do you have any comments which might supplement your memorandum of 8 February 1960, which consisted of your reaction to the above proposition?